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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

*
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
STEWART MICHAEL KELSEY,
Defendant-Appellant. J

Case No.
13376

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the appellant Stewart
Michael Kelsey of a conviction of second degree murder.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant Stewart Michael Kelsey was charged
with murder in the first degree after the death of one
Raymond Douglas Eagle. The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin found the appellant sane and competent to understand the nature of the processes against him and to aid
in his own defense. The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the Third Judicial District sat without jury at the
trial of the appellant and on April 18, 1973, found the
appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. The
appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
from ten years to life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks the affirmation of the trial
court's finding that the appellant was guilty of murder
in the second degree and an order refusing the appellant's
request for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees basically with the facts presented in appellant's brief but adds the following to clarify and add to what has been presented.
(1) Mrs. Betty Herron testified that even though
the police officers did not have a search warrant to look
in the house, they asked her if they could do so (R. 187).
Further, she stated that she wanted to be a law abiding
citizen and therefore allowed them in even though she
knew she could refuse to admit them (R. 187). At no
time did she or anyone ask them to leave.
The money paid Mrs. Herron by the appellant was
for a pre-existing debt from a previous residence. The
amount over and above the cost of the phone was $4 (R.
418).
(2) Dr. Dominic Albo, who performed surgery on
Raymond Eagle testified that the laceration of the liver
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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came from a blunt trauma (R. 222) and required considerable force for the liver to be injured in that manner (R. 228).
(3) Officer Jerry Campbell of the Salt Lake Police
Department spoke with the defendant for the first time
at approximately 10:35 p.m. on the evening of November
27, 1972 (R. 263). At that time, no Miranda warning
was given because it was not known the involvement and
acts of the defendant (R. 263-266). After approximately
30 minutes, the Miranda warning was given and a reporter took down his statement (R. 268). Nothing from
the conversation between Officer Campbell and the defendant which took place between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m.
was admitted into evidence at trial (R. 263-264). While
enroute to the defendant's quarters, the defendant was
once again told his rights (R. 270). The defendant helped
locate items used in the beating and told the officer about
the belt (R. 273).
(4) Stewart Michael Kelsey, defendant in the case,
admitted that his rights were given him three times that
evening (R. 289) and that he knew at that time that
anything he said would be used against him (R. 29).
When asked whether he understood the rights he said
yes (R. 293) and though he subsequently testified that
he wanted an attorney, he in fact never requested one
(R. 291).
(5) Richard Shepard, Deputy County Attorney,
testified that the defendant carried on a logical reasonable conversation with him (R. 307).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(6) Doctor Moench testified that the defendant
had a disorder whereby he had to gratify impulses (R.
452) and that his ability, to control such was diminished
(R. 452). The defendant was emotionally keyed up
from an altercation with his stepfather which took place
on a previous day (R. 454). He further testified that
there was probably no intent to harm the child until after
the event got underway (R. 455) and that the child's
actions made the defendant lash out (R. 456). It was
testified that the defendant knew right from wrong and
knew the nature and consequences of his acts (R. 458),
that it's not right to strike or make an injured child
walk and to do so could kill the child (R. 458-459). The
defendant was in the "normal" intelligence range (R.
465).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WAIVE
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
A.
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH COUNSEL AND THE COURT THAT THE DEATH
PENALTY WOULD NOT BE IMPOSED IN
THE CASE MAKING THE WAIVER OF A
JURY TRIAL PERMISSIBLE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The appellant relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 77-272 (1953), as the basis for this appeal. The pertinent
language of the statute is as follows:
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury,
but in all cases except where a sentence of
death may be imposed, trial by jury may be
waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall
be made in open court and entered in the
minutes." (Emphasis added.)
A cursory reading of this language makes it appear
that in every capital case, a trial by jury is an absolute
which cannot be waived. This position is propounded
at great length by the appellant in Argument I of his
brief. The respondent contends, however, that the standard so claimed is not "absolute," but hinges solely on
the determination whether the death penalty "may be
imposed."
The appellant argues strenuously that a judge must
impose a penalty of death in a first degree murder case
once the verdict of guilty is brought in and that only
the jury can request otherwise. This analysis has little
or no bearing on the case at bar since appellant
was found guilty of second degree murder rather than
first degree and since the prior ruling of the court allowing Kelsey to waive a jury (thereby impplying that no
death penalty would be imposed) mitigated any possibility of prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P. 2d 495
(1941), is cited by the appellant to indicate the differDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ence between the jury's function and that of the court.
It is an accepted standard, however, that the court decides points of law and not the jury. Thus, since the
United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972),
the status of Utah's death penalty has been in question.
No express answer has yet been given as to its staitus in
Utah. The respondent claims, however, that the totality
of the Furman case need not be examined in the case
at bar. What needs to be examined is the death penalty's status as it relates to the present situation,
In the case of State of Utah v. Christean and Rogers,
No. 13510, Utah Supreme Court case pending before this
Court and whose trial took place several weeks before
the present case, Mr. Gilbert Athay was appointed as
counsel in that case and trial was held in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
presiding. In the opening moments of that trial the
court ruled as follows:
" T H E C O U R T : Pursuant to the statute
quoted by Mr. Athay the statute requires in
this case that issues of fact must be tried by a
jury, but in all cases, except where a sentence
of death may be imposed, trial by jury may be
waived by the defendant. . . . [the Supreme
Court has said that statutes like ours, and I
indulge, are not constitutional at this time.
Therefore, I would have to hold that in no
event in this case could the sentence of death
be imposed. Therefore, you would have the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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right, according to our statute, to waive a jury
trial. What is your desire? Do you desire to
waive your constitutional right?]" (Emphasis
added) (T.7)
Whether Judge Baldwin misconstrued the Furman
case as it applies to Utah law is not paramount. What
is important is the fact that Mr. Hill, a legal associate
of Mr. Athay, relied on Judge Baldwin's ruling as did
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins. This understanding
of the court and counsel, though not made in open court
as was done in the Christean case is what all parties
relied on in the granting of the appellant's motion to
waive the jury trial. As such, the findings of law before
the trial commenced confirmed in the mind of counsel
and the court that the death penalty would not be invoked and that a ruling became the "law of the case."
See Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123, 257 P. 677 (1929),
which discusses the concept of "law of the case." No
exception was taken at the time of trial, and there is
nothing to show that the court or counsel moved for such
waiver in reckless disregard for what the outcome would
be. Mr. Hill and Judge Wilkins were fully aware of the
language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2. Mr. Hill's knowledge was particularly indicated by his discussion with
Mr. Kelsey wherein they viewed the meaning of a jury
trial and its waiver.
There is no way that the appellant can claim he
was prejudiced by such an understanding between the
court and counsel. If anything, prejudice was against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the state. The "law of the case" was that the death
penalty would not be applied even if the court found
murder in the first degree. Furthermore, there was no
prejudice in fact, since the court found the appellant
guilty of a lesser crime — murder in the second degree
which does not carry the penalty of death.
Appellant cites State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 32, 512
P. 2d 1031 (1973), and Roll v. Larsen, 30 Utah 2d 271,
516 P. 2d 1392 (1973), in support of his position that a
jury trial cannot be waived. Neither case is on point.
A careful reading of James and Roll indicates that the
court merely held that "capital" cases stall exist in Utah.
The entire opinions center around discussions of "classification" theory of offenses and how that theory stands
in light of Furman. Respondent concedes and agrees
with the court's opinions in James and Roll that certain
offenses are still capital in nature. The court said in
James:
"The Constitution of the State has provided a system of classifying certain serious
offenses as capital cases and then mandated
a specific procedural structure for the administration of justice based on that classification.
Furman v. Georgia cannot be rationally construed as abrogating our fundamental law."
The procedural structure referred to is that defendants may waive a jury trial in all cases except where
the death penalty may be applied. Therefore, in capital
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cases where a death penalty may be a reality, one must
be tried by a jury of twelve. In the present case, however, it was the "law of the case" that the death penalty
could not be imposed, thus allowing a waiver of jury
trial, which means a waiver of the twelve man jury as prescribed by James. Thus, it must be concluded that capital offenses still exist, but that the waiver of the jury
trial in the instant case was and is not governed by the
James and Roll cases as asserted by the appellant.
The respondent therefore submits that no prejudice
exists which would demand the reversal for a new trial.
The understanding of all parties involved made the possibility of the death penalty a nullity and therefore the
trial court's findings should be sustained.
B.
JURY TRIAL IS WAIVABLE BY DEFENDANTS IN CAPITAL CASES AND UTAH
CONSTITUTIONAL AND S T A T U T O R Y
LANGUAGE IS NO BAR THERETO.
Though a first reading of Utah constitutional and
statutory provisions appears to indicate otherwise, there
is strong reason to allow waiver of jury trials in those
cases raised by the appellant. Absolute standards can
be detrimental to those whom they are designed to protect. Flexibility must exist to prevent undue prejudice
if the defendants in particular instances feel such would
take place.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Supposed fairness" is the argument used to establish the sanctity of a jury trial — especially in capital
cases. This philosophy of fairness is deeply rooted in
the common law. Such background led to Utah's enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 on which appellant's
arguments are based. Basically, this protection was used
to protect individuals from the tyrannny of the state.
Today's "Due Process" procedures make available to an
accused the protections upon which the jury trial system
was based. The standards now insure that protections
will be afforded and followed —the courts being the
determiner of their effectiveness. The language emphasized by the appellant, is merely a verbal expression pointing out the importance of keeping the right to jury trial
a reality. This simply means that such a right cannot
be destroyed or ignored and that such a right shall always
exist.
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution says:
"In capital cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate" (Emphasis added.) "Inviolate" has been defined in jurisdictions such as Washington, State v. Furth,
5 Wash. 2d 1, 104 P. 2d 925 (1940), to mean that the
right cannot be "impaired" or "abridged" in any way,
but must always exist. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 takes
this language and attempts to make the standard absolute. In other words, the statute attempts to make jury
trials absolute in certain instances even though the constitution does not go that far. The propriety of attempting to expand the constitutional language without conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stitutional amendment is clearly questionable. The constitution merely provides that the right is absolute, but
does not state that the application of that right is absolute or that the right can never be waived.
Respondent contends that many circumstances can
arise where an accused charged with murder in the first
degree would desire to waive a jury trial. The article
"waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases," 25 Mich.
Law Review 695 (1927), lists what could be considered
a few of the reasons. The list contains the following:
1

The charge is of a revolting nature.

2

The entire state or community is aroused.

3

The past record of the accused is bad.

4

Public sentiment might influence jury.

5

Great deal of publicity before trial.

6

I t is a prosecution involving race.

7

Judges greater experience can be valuable to the accused.

8

Feeling that the jury will convict on
general principles instead of evidence.

9

Confidence in fairer trial by judiciary.

10

Reluctance to go to trial on complicated
issues.

11)

A desire to avoid the cumbersomeness
and delay of a jury trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Certainly, these eleven reasons are not all inclusive,
but they show that an absolute standard could work as
a detriment in specific instances. It is obvious that in
many cases it may be advantageous to have a trial by
a judge without a jury — to deny such a choice might
in itself deny the accused the right to a fair trial and
make the jury an instrument of oppression rather than
a means of "fair protection."
The Ohio Supreme Court held many years ago in
Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 120 N. E. 234 (1918),
that:
"Clearly this right [of jury trial] is for
the benefit of the accused. If he regards it
in the particular case as a burden, a hardship,
a prejudice to fair trial, why in the name of
reason should he not be permitted to waive it
and submit his case to the magistrate.... What
was given to him generally as a shield should
not be used as a sword in case he feels that a
jury trial in such a case would so result."
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that circumstances exist in which a jury trial may be waived without
even trying the case to establish the facts. The court
has openly acknowledged through its decisions that the
plea of guilty, made in open court, takes the place of
trial and verdict. Thus, if an accused in a first degree
murder case enters a plea of guilty it is clear that he
effectively waives jury trial even though the offense may
be punishable by death.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383
(1946), the Utah Supreme Court established that a plea
of guilty dispenses with the jury because the plea is the
same as if a jury had found the accused guilty. The court
said:
" H e contends that the evidence shows that
he pleaded guilty as a matter of convenience,
and that a plea of guilty does not amount to
a conviction. Such novel argument is specious.
Unless timely withdrawan, a plea of guilty
places a defendant in the same position as a
verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the
charge after a fair and impartial trial. A plea
of guilty is a confession of the correctness of
the accusation which dispenses with the necessity of proof thereof."
This holding was recently upheld in Coombs v. Turner,
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 (1971), when the coua*
said:
"A plea of guilty dispenses with the necessity of proof, and the issue of innocence or
guilt cannot here be relitigated any more than
it could be after a jury verdict of guilty."
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct.
253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), involved the interpretation of
Art. Ill, Section 2, para. 3 of the United States Constitution requiring jury trial in all criminal cases. In rejecting this absolute standard and language the Court
stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"In the light of the foregoing it is reasonable to conclude that the framers of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused....
Upon this view of the constitution provisions we conclude that article 3, § 2, is not
jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right
upon the accused which he may forego at his
election. To deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement. . . .
After an extensive review of the authorities and a discussion of the question on principle, the court concluded that, since it was
permissible for an accused person to plead
guilty and thus waive any trial, he must necessarily be able to waive a jury trial."
See also, Mason v. United States, 250 F. 2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1957).
In light of the foregoing authority, it seems unreasonable to permit an accused to dispense with every stage
of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to dispense
with a particular form of trial (trial by jury) by cootisent
or waiver. These inconsistencies must give way to the
better reasoned rule that the right to trial by jury —
even in light of the statutory language of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-2 is not absolute but must depend on circumstances in each particular case. Such a waiver is
not contrary to sound conceptions of fairness or public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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policy. If, for instance, the court holds that the death
penalty will not apply in a particular case, then it is not
error for the accused to waive the jury.
The law permits venue to insure a fair trial, or to
allow the accused the best position. Why then, if an
individual honestly feels he would be judged more fairly
by a judge sitting without a jury, should we force him
to have his case heard by a jury? This type of force runs
counter to Utah's as well as the United States' conception of justice.
New York had no difficulty in realizing that this
force should not be used. Article I, Section 2 of the New
York Constitution is as explicit as Utah's statute and
yet, the court allowed waiver. The pertinent language
of the New York Constitution is as follows:
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional
provision shall remain inviolate forever * * *.
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant
in all criminal cases, except those in which the
crime charged may be punishable by death, by
a written instrument signed by the defendant
in person in open court before and with the
approval of a judge or justice of a court having
jurisdiction to try the offense."
This constitutional provision was interpreted by the New
York Court in People v. Duchin, 12 N. Y. 2d 351, 190
N. E. 2d 17 (1963), where an individual charged with
rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree,
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carnal abuse of a child . . ., waived jury trial and later
challenged that waiver on appeal. The court held that
the jury trial may be waived in all cases despite the
language of the constitution. The majority held that
if an intelligent and knowing waiver is made, the jury
may be waived. The court said:
"The provision is designed for the benefit
of the defendant. When, choosing to be tried
by a judge alone, he requests a waiver, he is
entitled to it as a matter of right once it appears
to the satisfaction of the judge of the court
having jurisdiction that, first, the waiver is
tendered in good faith and is not a stratagem
to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage— . . . —and, second, that the
defendant is fully aware of the consequences
of the choice he is making."
Further, Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution contains the following language regarding jury trials:
"And the legislature shall not make any
law that shall subject any person to a capital
or infamous punishment. . . . without trial by
jury."
In interpreting this language, the Massachusetts Court
held in Commonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N. E. 537 (Mass.,
1926), that:
"We find nothing in the words of our
Constitution which declares or manifests an
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intention to deprive the individual of power to
refuse to assert his constitutional right to trial
by jury."
Thus, it can be clearly seen that there is support
to the proposition that an individual can waive jury trial
in capital offenses such as the one at bar.
It is further established that nearly all rights granted
by the United States Constitution may be waived. The
only ones which appear to conflict with such a statement
are "due process" or "equal protection" rights which
themselves are made up of other waivable rights — such
as trial by jury.
The United States Supreme Court has accepted this
philosophy and subsequently established it by holding
that "knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional
guarantees is only needed for those guarantees affecting
due process." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218,
93 S. Ct. 2041, 361 F. 2d 854 (1973). The court recognizes that it is wrong to force rights upon an individual
if he does not want their protection. Rights are afforded
individuals to insure protections. If such protections are
not wanted, not needed, or possible detriments to an
accused, he should have the unalterable right to say "I
don't want that right."
The following are some of the rights which have been
held to be waivable. (1) Right to a jury trial in criminal
cases. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct.
253 (1930). (2) Right against self-incrimination. Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
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16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). (3) Right to confront witnesses.
Illinois v. Alien, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ok 1057, 25 L. Ed.
353 (1970). (4) Right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Mingo,
407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ck 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).
(5) Right to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). (6) Search
and Seizure protections. Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347, 88 S. Ck 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). (7) Grand
Jury indictment. Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1,
79 S. Ck 991, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959).
These few cases are, of course, only a representative
sample of the many waivable rights. An individual of
normal competence and intelligence should have some
power over determining his future. He had that right
when the crimes were committed. He should also have
that right in relation to the consequences thereto.
It is therefore submitted that public policy supports
the view that an accused should be permitted to waive
his right to jury trial.
POINT II.
A P P E L L A N T SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CLAIM REVERSIBLE ERROR
(IF ERROR THERE WAS) SINCE SUCH
ERROR WAS INDUCED BY THE APPELLANT AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions, limits
the rights of appellants in what can and cannot be apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pealable errors. Such situations come into existence where
defendants pled error to some facet of a trial where they
induced the court into error or acquiesced to the decision
made. This "after-the-fact" argument is exactly what
appellant Kelsey is doing on this appeal. Simply stated,
he is attempting to better his chances by claiming error
to the ruling of the court which he asked the court to
make. This "afterthought" approach claims "prejudice"
when in fact no such prejudice existed.
Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree but was not found guilty of that offense. He was
found guilty of murder in the second degree — a lesser
offense — and received a lighter sentence than if he had
been convicted of the capital offense. Appellant claims
this is "prejudice." Respondent cannot understand how
this conclusion is reached. It is not prejudicial for an
accused to get a lighter sentence, when, as in this case,
the evidence is arguably strong enough to convince a
jury that premediated murder took place and that appellant was guilty of that greater offense. Respondent urges
the court to recognize this non-prejudicial decision of the
court not that claimed by appellant.
in
S.
of
at

A leading case of the United States Supreme Court
this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 18, 63
Ct. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943), held that the practice
claiming error on appeal from self-induced requests
trial cannot be sustained. The Court said:
"We cannot permit an accused to elect
to pursue one course at the trial and then, when
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that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist
on appeal that the course which he rejected
at the trial be reopened to him. However unwise the first choice may have been, the range
of waiver is wide. Since the protection which
could have been obtained was plainly waived,
the accused cannot now be heard to charge
the court with depriving him of a fair trial.
The court only followed the course which he
himself helped to chart and in which he acquiesced until the case was argued on appeal.
The fact that the objection did not appear in
the motion for new trial or in the arguments
of error makes clear that the point now is a
'mere afterthought., "
If a party adheres to a particular mode of strategy
in open court and either misleads or joints in any error
induced by his strategy, and does not raise or claim such
error at this time, he should not be permitted to complain of unfairness by repudiating the course of trial he
originally called for. Justice is not a system made up
of accepted standards where parties can go back on their
word — if you lose, repudiate your motions, agreements,
and acts — but one where procedures are established to
allow the orderly objection and handling of errors which
do take place. (See also People v. Pijal, 33 Cal. App. 2d
682, 109 Cal. Rpfcr. 230 (1973)).
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil, the
Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the position referred to above. In State v. Aiken, 87 Utah 507,
51 P. 2d 1052 (1935) the Court said:
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"We think the rule applicable that a party
cannot successfully assign as error a ruling
which he himself induced the court to make."
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P. 2d 107
(1972), where the defendant' s counsel chose to examine
a witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed
on appeal that it was prejudicial error for the judge to
have granted such motion. The court made it clear that
the error complained of was self-induced and that it
would not be permitted to stand on appeal. The court
said:
"Counsel chose not to do so, whether as
a matter of strategy or otherwise—and it does
not lie in the mouth of defendant now to claim
error having either wittingly or unwittingly
invited it."
In the present situation, it is not totally clear why
appellant Kelsey wanted a trial without a jury. Discussions pertaining thereto are off the record and are guarded
by the attorney-client privilege. But, whether the appellant's separate counsel convinced him "wittingly or
unwittingly" to move for such waiver is now of no concern. The fact is such motion was made, the judge was
forced to rule, he did so, and the appellant accepted the
ruling because it was what he desired. The appellant
should not be allowed to now claim, as be looks back
over his conviction, that prejudicial error of any magnitude took place.
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The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on this issue
on many other occasions. Many of them, however, concerned themselves with civil cases which do not have the
same gravity of effect. The respondent submits, however,
that the principles and law laid down in those cases
a
PPly just as well to the case at bar as to the situations
under which the holdings were rendered. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d
347 (1943), held:
"A party who takes a position which
either leads a court into error or by conduct
approves the error committed by the court,
cannot later take advantage of such error in
procedure."
Later, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272
P. 2d 185 (1954), the court expanded and reaffirmed what
it had said many times before. The court said in part:
"Furthermore, it is well established that
a party cannot assign as error the giving of
his own requests. H e cannot lead the court
into error and then be heard to complain thereof. . . . "
Decisions from other jurisdictions supporting respondent's position are voluminous. Some recent cases
in support thereof are: People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App.
3d 242, 108 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1973), holding that a party
is estopped from asserting error on appeal that was induced by his own conduct. "He may not lead a judge
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into substantial error and then complain of it." (Emphasis added.) Mack v. United States, 310 A. 2d 234 (D. C.
App., 1973), holding that one cannot invite error and
complain of prejudice; People v. Shackelford, 511 P. 2d
19 (Colo., 1973), holding that the party who was the
instrument of injecting error must aibide by the consequences of such errors; People v. Miles, 13 111. App. 3d
45, 300 N. E. 2d 822 (1972), which held that a defendant
would not be permitted to argue an alleged error where
his counsel of record actually invited and affirmatively
participated in the procedure which he now claimed as
error.
In the present case, Mr. Hill conversed with appellant in detail about waiving a jury trial and based on
these out of court discussions, appellant determined that
he wanted to waive trial by jury (R. 96). A motion was
made shortly after the court was called to order. The
court questioned the appellant as to his desire to waive
jury trial and the transcript of the trial indicates that the
appellant had an ample understanding of what was taking
place. Appellant does not contend otherwise.
Simply because appellant Kelsey is represented by
different counsel on appeal does not authorize appellant
now to reject his own and his former counsel's actions
and motions before the trial judge. Certainly, the record
, establishes that the appellant led the trial court into
allowing the waiver of jury trial.
In light of the foregoing analysis and authority, as
well as the dear implications and statements contained
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in the record, it is respectfully submitted that the appellant Kelsey cannot now claim injury for something he
himself led the court to do. This is especially significant
in light of the fact that no prejudice took place since
the entire history and record of this case contains no
evidence of such. It is therefore submitted that on this
ground alone, the contentions of the appellant should
be rejected.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER WAS A VOLUNTARY AND KNOWING WAIVER OF HIS
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, AND TO
HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT DURING POLICE QUESTIONING.
The issue presented by the appellant within Pfrint
III of his brief is whether the evidence sustains that he
knowing and voluntary waived his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel present during questioning.
Appellant's first challenge is premised upon mistake
and the second upon capacity. Respondent will treat
these arguments in that order.
The best evidence as to the voluntariness and fcnowingness of appellant's actions at the time of bis confession
is derived from an examination of the recorded confession
(State's Exhibit 20).
The confession contains ample evidence of efforts
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by the state to insure the defendant's understanding of
his Fifth Amendment Rights, as prescribed in Miranda
v. Arizona, supra.
(1) Page one (1) of the confession records the following exchange:
Q.

Stewart, you were advised of your rights
before by Sgt. J O H N S O N . We agin
want to advise you of your rights.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law. You have the right
to talk to a lawyer and have him present
with you while you are being questioned.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one
will be appointed to represent you before
any questioning, if you wish one.
Do you understand each of these rights
I have explained to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Having these rights in mind, do you wish
to talk to us now?

A.

Yes.

Q.

If you wish to answer our questions now
without contacting a lawyer or without
a lawyer present, you have the right to stop
answering questions at any time. Do you
understand each of these rights?

A.

Yes.

(2)

On page seven (7) an effort was again made
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to insure the voluntary and knowing nature of defendant's admission:
Q.

Do ( R H ) you have any questions Officer
CAMPBELL?

A.

No, I think that is about it.

Q.

When this statement is typed up, will
you be willing to sign this?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was this statement you have given here
voluntary?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you under any stress or coercion?
(RH)

A.

I don't know what coercion is.

Q.

Has anyone forced you to give this?

A.

No.

Q.

Are you under the influence of any drugs ?

A.

Not at this moment.

Q.

Are you under the influence of any liquor
or alcholic beverages?

A.

Not at this moment.

Q.

After this statement is typed, you will
be given a copy in addition to the copies
in which you indicated you would sign. Is
that correct?

A.

Yes.
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The transcript supports the full compliance by the
state with the objective standards of Miranda. Each
and every indication of defendant's misunderstanding
of this very explicit "Miranda" warning, as explained by
the defendant himself (R. 286-289), arose after the appellant's confession.
Clearly, the invitation to self-serving confusion and
exculpatory misunderstanding would prove irresistible if
this occurrence were to allow defendants to nullify and
rescind an otherwise sufficient confession merely by
claiming a subsequent misunderstanding as to the meaning of the warning. The respondent is without knowledge
of any subsequent Supreme Court decision treating the
effect, if any, of a subsequent denial of a knowledgeable
and voluntary confession which was entered after a
"Miranda" warning where the accused acknowledged his
understanding of its provisions.
Various state and lower federal courts have examined
this issue and have found the ex post facto test of confusion by appellant to be unworkable and fraught with
the probability of self-serving declarations of mistake.
In Foster v. State, 304 N. E. 2d 534 (Ind. 1973), that
court held that a defendant could not claim later, after
having been given a full "Miranda" warning, that he did
not understand his right to have counsel present, or that
counsel would be appointed if he could not afford to retain one. This objective approach to Miranda, is not
isolated, and was also adopted by the Court in State v.
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McKnight, 52 N. J. 35, 243 A. 2d 240, 251 (1968), wherein
the court concluded:
"Hence if a defendant was given the
Miranda warnings, if the coercion of custodial
interrogation was thus dissipated, his 'waiver'
was no less Voluntary' and 'knowing' and 'intelligent' because he misconceived the inculpatory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because
he thought that what he said could not be used
because it was oral or because he had his fingers
crossed, or because he could well have used a
lawyer." (Emphasis added.)
In Jones v. State, 252 N. E. 2d 572, 577 (Ind. 1969),
that court found that a full "Miranda" warning, which
the defendant acknowledged as understandable at the
time given, established a prima facie case that a confession entered pursuant to the warning was voluntarily
and intelligently offered. The burden was then shifted
to the defendant to prove his error of understanding or
his incapacity to make a knowing waiver. See also Frazier
v. United States, 476 F. 2d 891, 898 (D. C. Or. 1971),
An enlightening article in 52 N. C. L. Rev. 454, at 460
(Dec. 1973), reviewing the post Miranda cases concluded:
"An accused can rarely expect to nullify
or express waiver and confession simply by
testifying that he misunderstood his rights. . ."
The article continues, at 462-463, that the police cannot
be expected to employ a subjective standard to determine
when a waiver and confession were "really" voluntary,
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absent some overt and discemable sign which should
elert them to the defendant's incapacity to understand
his actions.
Respondent maintains there was no external showing of record which would indicate defendant's misunderstanding if in fact it did exist. The defendant's own
words at trial confirm this finding (R. 291-293). This
jurisdiction should embrace the majority and objective
test and reject appellant's belated assertion of misunderstanding as to his waiver and confession.
Appellant's second argument relating to this aspect
of the case is the assertion that he did not have the
capacity to make a knowing waiver. This subject is
treated in 69 A. L. R. 2d 348:
" The law on the question under annotation
is relatively clear and may be summarized as
follows: mental subnormality on the paret of
one confessing to a crime does not of itself deprive the confession of voluntariness or for its
admission in evidence, so long as the subnormality has not deprived the person in question
of the capacity to understand the meaning and
effect of the confession."
This annotation is made applicable to post Miranda
cases in 69 A. L. R. 2d, Later Case Service (Supp. 1974)
at 142, which maintains the general rule that some objective showing of incapacity must be made by the aggrieved party for the waiver or confession to be held
void. In Coney v. State, 491 S. W. 2d 501 (Mo. 1973),
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the confession of a 16 year old, accused of murder, was
admissible where, although he was illiterate and of subnormal mentality, he was found capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong and able to understand the
significance of his criminal act. See also State v. Sisneros,
79 N. W. 600, 446 P. 2d 875 (1968); Encina v. State, 471
S. W. 2d 384 (Tex. Crim. 1971.
Respondent maintains that appellant's assertion as
to the burden of proof is fundamentally misplaced. A
close reading of State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.
2d 772 (1969), indicates a prima facie case of voluntary
waiver is established where defendant was apprised of
his rights and then waived them. The present record
does not establish sufficient evidence of defendant's incapacity, or of a confession entered under circumstances
of duress or coercion to regard it as inadmissible. Appellant's statement that the defendant was subnormal is
wholly conclusionary, (App. Br. P. 23), since Dr. Moench
in testimony testified that the appellant was in the "normal" range (R. 465).
The record supports the conclusion that the defendant had sufficient capacity under the tests discussed, supra, to enter a voluntary waiver of the rights
in question and enter his confession of guilt. Dr. Moench,
the psychiatrist, called upon to examine the defendant
prior to trial, testified that defendant could distinguish
right from wrong and was aware of the nalture of his
actions (R. 459). Defendant testified, though maintaining he misunderstood his right to counsel and silence that
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he was competent to understand the nature of the
"Miranda" rights (R. 294). Further, the deputy county
attorney, Mr. Shepard, who attempted to assist the defendant after the arrest, testified that the defendant was
both lucid and capable of understanding the nature of
his actions (R. 307-308). Appellant's assertion that the
defendant was not capable of entering a voluntary or
intelligent waiver of his rights must be dismissed as
without support in the record.
Respondent would join with appellant in desiring an
infallible subjective test by which to gauge the actual
intent and understanding of an accused. This idealistic
jurisprudence, unfortunately, is not within present vision;
without malice, therefore, respondent must ask that appellant's attack upon his voluntary waiver of rights and
confession be dismissed as without basis in law or fact.
This conclusion is required by State v. Allen, 29 Utah
2d 88, 90, 505 P. 2d 302 (1973), where this court concluded:
"This court will not disturb the finding
of the trial court a confession was voluntarily
made in the absence of a showing of an abuse
of discretion, where there is substantial evidence upon which the trial court could reasonably so find."
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED
THE I N T R O D U C T I O N OF OBJECTS
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TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S DWELLING
PLACE.
In allowing into evidence items taken from appellant's dwelling, the Lower Court premised its action upon
one of two theories (R. 433):
(1) The defendant did not have standing to object to the search since the residence
was under the exclusive control of Mrs. Herron (the defendant's mother) where she had
freely and without coercion or duress consented
to the search;
(2) The defendant had by silence and
affirmative acts consented to the search.
The facts indicate Mrs. Herron had exclusive control of the dwelling with the defendant being at most a
tenant at will in her household. With such a relationship,
a vast majority of courts hold the doctrine of Sterner v.
California, 376 U. S. 483, 84 S. Ot. 889, 11 L. E. 2d 856
(1964), as applicable.
The following excerpts of trial testimony indicate
that the defendant was living with Mrs. Herron within
a familial relationship and not as a boarder or tenant.
This relationship is significant in establishing the exclusive right of Mrs. Herron to allow a search of the
premises absent objection by the defendant. On this
point, the record discloses:
(1)

Mrs. Herron had received forty
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dollars ($40) from her son. All but four
dollars ($4) of this amount was for payment
or an antecedent debt (R. 419).
(2) The defendant shared the room with
other relations and did not exercise exclusive
use. Further, there was no petition to define
defendant's living area, nor did defendant have
a key (R. 420).
In State v. Schott, 182 N. W. 2d 878, 880 (Minn.
1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded a mother
had exclusive dominion of a residence. A resultant right
to permit a warrantless search of her son's room existed
even when there was not a landlord tenant relationship
between the mother and son established through the
payment of consideration and where the exclusive use
of a room or area was acknowledged. The decision, at
879 footnote (1), indicates the right of a parent to allow
a search of the area in which a child resides to be the
majority rule.
The Maryland Court in Jones v. State, 13 Md. App.
309, 283 A. 2d 184, 186 (1972), further supports the contention that a defendant's parent may consent to the
search of a room or area used by the defendant when
there was not a tenancy relationship. The cases in 31
A. L. R. 2d 1081-1083 also support the conclusion, in the
instant case, that Mrs. Herron had the sale and exclusive
right to grant or deny a search of her residence.
There remains for consideration the issue of consent
by Mrs. Herron to the search. The transcript of trial
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establishes that Mrs. Herron allowed the police to enter
and search the premises only after they had requested
to do so (R. 173-174). The record further discloses that
she had acceded to the requests voluntarily, motivated
by her desire to be " . . . a law-abiding citizen" and, with
clear knowledge that she could refuse any such request
for entrance, (R. 187). Against this factual setting, the
assertion that Mrs. Herron was coerced or acted under
duress in allowing the police to search her residence takes
on an air of whimsical speculation.
Even absent the aforementioned facts, there is not
affirmative duty, under the Fourth Amendment, to inform those having ownership or control of a premise of
their right to deny such searches, or to elicit from them
a knowing waiver to such searches. The Supreme Court
has determined in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra,
that knowledge of a right to refuse entry is not a prerequisite of voluntary consent.
As to the second argument discussed by the trial
court, respondent does not believe the defendant, within
the facts of this case, possessed an independent right
of refusal to deny the search of his mother's residence.
The record, however, indicates defendant not only did
not object, but tendered a voluntary acquiescence to the
search by becoming an active participant (R. 272).
The instant case appears to parallel this court's
holding in State v. Lopez, supra, where a voluntary admission, leading to a search, which was not objected to,
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was held to constitute a binding consent to the search
under the Fourth Amendment requirements.
Again, it is not a constitutional requirement under
the Schneckloth decision, supra, to look beyond apparent
facts to determine if defendant knew or was fully appraised of his rights before a search of the residence could
be allowed.
POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT FULFILLED ALL REQUISITES OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-2 attempts to define "malice"
as follows:
"Such malice may be express or implied.
I t is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of a
fellow creature. I t is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
Here attempts are made to distinguish some levels
of intent and/or action so as to positulate the exact crime
committed. Respondent feeds that appellant's brief is
full of innuendos supporting the position that without
actual defined pre thought-out intent, the requirement
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of malice is not fulfilled and no finding of murder can
be made. This court has not given such a broad and
sweeping interpretation to the law of this state.
It is presented by the respondent, that even the
diminished capacity of the appellant does not do away
with the fulfillment of the malice requirement when
taken into account with the entire record. This court
has emphasized that to be guilty of second degree murder
does not require an explicit intent to kill. In State v.
Matteri, 119 Utah 143, 225 P. 2d 325 (1950), this court
upheld the first degree murder conviction of the appellant even though the trial court had failed to instruct
the jury on the possibility of second degree murder when
there existed an intent to kill. The court said:
"Eliminated from the case entirely, so far
as second degree murder is concerned, is the
possibility of second degree murder where there
exists an intent to kill. While intent to kill is
not a necessary requisite to second degree murder, it may be an important element if there is
absent other elements to raise the killing to first
degree murder" (Emphasis added.)
Though the court continued by discussing the aspects
of intent, malice aforethought and premeditation, the
court did squarely indicate that sufficient evidence could
exist without proving "intent to kill" which would be
sufficient for a finding of murder in the second degree.
Appellant's statement that the defendant acted solely
out of fear (Appellant's brief, P. 28) is conclusionary in
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the sense that though Dr. Moench testified that it was
his opinion that such was the case, the defendant also
knew that it was not right to strike or make an injured
child walk (R. 458) and defendant knew that striking
an injured child could kill that child (R. 459). Dr.
Moench's entire testimony is filled with such conflicts
such as: The appellant knew what was right and wrong
but didn't have intent to hurt; or the defendant was not
insane at the time of the incident but couldn't control
his acts. It is therefore up to the trier of fact to determine from all evidence whether the defendant knew that
hitting the child would cause injury. If so, then sufficient intent and malice does exist to warrant the court's
finding of murder in the second degree.
It is not prejudicial for the court to find the state
not upholding its burden of proof regarding the premeditated first degree murder, but to find murder in the second degree. The appellant contends such error and cites
State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), in
support thereof. Russell, as well as State v. Thompson,
110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946), merely stand for
the proposition that intent to kill may be, but is not required to be, an element of second degree murder. In
Russell, the prejudicial error resulted from the trial court's
instruction that the defendant had to have the specific
intent to kill in order to commit second degree murder
(106 Utah at 131-2). Thus, Russell is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In Thompson, the prejudicial
error resulted from the trial court's failure to instruct
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the jury that a necessary element of first degree murder,
on the theory of a killing perpetrated by an act greatly
dangerous to others' lives evidencing a depraved mind
regardless of human life, was a planned and intentional
shooting (110 Utah at 129, 170 at 161). Thus, Thompson,
too, is entirely different from the instant case.
The appellant relies heavily on the testimony of Dr.
Moench. Many of his statements as indicated above are
not totally in harmony with the innocence of the appellant for reasons of diminished capacity. Dr. Moench did
testify that an intense emotional buildup took place
within the defendant before the day in question as a
result of an argument with the defendant's stepfather
(R. 454). "The defendant reported that he was extremely
angry at this time, was almost ready to kill the stepfather" (R. 454).
It cannot be substantially disproved from the record
that the defendant did not know his actions could lead
to harm and possibly murder if a release was found for
this buildup.
The court found that even with this impulse to
gratify his anxieties, sufficient capacity existed on the
part of the defendant to realize the effects of what was
taking place. Simply because there was no direct proof
that the appellant "lied in wait" or meticulously planned
the murder of the victim does not show that murder did
not take place in compliance with the definition of the
Code. In fact, the court did so find that the pre-meditation required for first degree murder was not proven,
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but that sufficient evidence existed to make reasonable
men conclude that even with diminished capacity, the
defendant knew or should have known that serious bodily
injury would happen if the young child was hit.
Though the appellant places great emphasis on State
v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 251, 214 P. 2d 626 (1950), the respondent indicates that that holding was modified by
Matteri, supra, in that specific beforehand intent to kill
is not a necessity for the conviction of murder in the
second degree. The respondent therefore submits that
there was sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant
was guilty of murder in the second degree.
POINT VI.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
Appellant attempts to create a "void" of evidence
relating to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Such contentions in themselves have no merit when the
entire record is viewed and total testimony of all concerned is studied. Thus, the respondent submits the following in support of its position that the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law are supported by sufficient
evidence.
Finding of Fact number three relating to the intent
to cause bodily harm or that the defendant should have
known that such would take place, was testified to exDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tensively by Dr. Moench. Not only did Dr. Moench state
his opinion (which can or cannot be considered "the right
answer" by the trier of fact) that the actions of the defendant were impulsive, but he also stated that the appellant was emotionally keyed up from a previous day,
that "there was nothing in my examination that indicated
there was any intent to harm the child until after the
event got underway9' (R. 455), (Emphasis added) th^t
the child's acts made the defendant lash out, and that
the defendant knew right and wrong and knew the consequences of his acts (R. 458). The defendant was legally
and medically sane at the time of the incident and he
knew that striking an injured child could kill that child
(R. 459). The opinion of Dr. Moench further contained
the statement that the defendant knew hitting in the
stomach injures (R. 467).
Certainly, these statements by Dr. Moench which
also support the finding of diminished capacity show that
the defendant did have faculties available for which the
judge could find malice. Not only these statements, but
the confession of the defendant himself (State's exhibit
20) indicates clearly that he should have known injuries
existed after having hit the victim. When the appellant
saw a bump on the head of the victim he said: "I really
got worried then" (State's exhibit 20, p. 6), realizing
that something serious was wrong, yet he continued to
hit the victim. It was not erroneous for the court to find
as fact that the defendant knew or should have known
the consequences of his acts.
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From the testimony deduced above and that which
relates to the points in issue, Conclusions of Law two
and three are supported by findings of fact. Appellant
makes it appear that without certain desires or intents
to kill, malice aforethought cannot be established. Respondent contends that this might be true of only one or two
blows were struck, but not only did it cease to stop with
that, but belts, spray bottles, and sheer force were used
in a most atrocious way to cause harm. Evidence indeed supports the finding that the appellant should have
known the consequences of his acts. Therefore, it is a
logical conclusion based on those findings that malice did
in fact exist in support of the court's finding of murder
in the second degree. No inconsistency appears and certainly the trier of fact did not usurp any unwarranted
authority to make the findings and conclusions it did.
In the closing language of the Tenth Circuit in Williams v. United States, 267 F. 2d 559 (10th Cir. 1959),
cited by the appellant the court said:
"In other words, the court in effect found
the issues of fact against appellant; and the
crucial findings have adequate support in the
record and are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, they must not be disturbed on appeal."
Though this case is clearly distinguishable on facts
alone, the application of the above language says that
unless the findings are "clearly erroneous" they will not
be disturbed on appeal.
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The respondent has reviewed the entire transcript
and record with particularity and finds "no clearly erroneous" findings in the entire matter. Respondent therefore prays this Court to so find and deny any request
for acquittal or new trial.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL IN THIS ACTION WAS COMPLETE AND WITHOUT ERROR EVEN
THOUGH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE ENTERED BY
A JUDGE OTHER THAN HE WHO HEARD
THE EVIDENCE.
Appellant's final argument on appeal is a bootstrapping attempt to get this court to act in opposition to the
fair processes of trial. This argument is therefore nonmeritous and should be rejected as having no substantial basis for either acquitted or reversal.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says
in part:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A." (Emphasis
added.)
The language emphasized above does not require that
said findings of fact or conclusions of law be in writing
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or of a formal nature — only that they be made in some
form of clarity. The judgment is required to be entered.
The respondent submits that this test or requirement
was met at the close of trial when Judge Wilkins found
the appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. The
court said:
" T H E C O U R T : . . .The parties having
rested and submitted final argument, this is my
ruling: I find that the defendant, Stewart
Michael Kelsey, is guilty of the crime of
murder in the second degree. The testimony of
two of Utah's most distinguished medical doctors, one a psychiatrist, and one a forensic pathologist, coupled with other corroborating testimony, demonstrated that the defendant had a
diminished ability to control himself in the commission of this crime, and, therefore, the elements of murder in the first degree beyond
those requisite for murder in the second degree
were not proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. I do find, however, that the state
has proved each and every element of the crime
of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt." (R. 526-527).
Contained herein is each and every fact and conclusion
of law upon which the formal findings were made. From
the fact that the appellant had a diminished capacity to
control his impulses to the rejections of premeditaftion
necessary for first degree murder, the court made certain
that all understood that the appellant Stewart Michael
Kelsey had done everything required to be convicted of
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murder in the second degree. This, of course, includes
the fact that he was the one causing injury, he did so
knowing the consequence of his acts, and that said beating was intentionally done with malice aforethought.
This court has not resolved all conflicts or possible
situations which could arise under Rule 52 and Rule 63
and as such it seems consistent with justice and fairness
to interpret the language of said rule to include this
"spirit" of the law, and not rely solely on the formal
requite of written and signed findings.
As far as appellant trying to bootstrap it must be
noted that a final judgment and sentence were pronounced and signed by Judge Wilkins on whether formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law should be made
and entered. Three months passed from the time the
court found defendant guilty of murder in the second
degree (R. 527) until said motion was made (R. 532).
Thus, the request for formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law did not go to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, but solely for written findings to allow
preparation for appeal or other nonconbrolling reasons.
The appellant cites Makah Indian Tribe v. Moore,
93 F. Supp. 105 (D. C. Wash., 1950), in support of his
argument that findings of fact and conclusions of law
should not be signed by a subsequent judge. The case
at bar is distinguishable and the facts presented add
different insight into the case than what appellant asserts.
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Makah involved the interpretation of F. R. C. P. 63
which is essentially the same as Utah's present Rule 63.
Therein a judge who heard the case died before either
the findings were made or judgment signed. This judge
did, however, give oral findings and conclusions although
they were not so labelled or separable. The court said,
however:
"From the foregoing it is apparent that
the opinion of Judge Black is sufficient to
stand for formal findings of fact and conclusions of law if it indicates "the factual basis
for the ultimate conclusion" and if it "provides a clear understanding of the basis of the
decision."
The court found that because sufficient reason was given
for the findings made, a subsequent judge according to
Rule 63 had the power to sign the judgment. The court
added a matter of dictum by saying:
"It is unnecessary that I also sign the submitted findings and conclusions. In fact it
would be improper for me to do so as Judge
Black was the one who heard the evidence and
saw the witnesses and the exhibits. I t was his
decision."
Thus, this case did not stand solely for what the
appellant purports, but for the fact that what was said
from the bench was sufficient to allow a subsequent judge
to sign the judgment.
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In the case at bar the judgment was signed and the
defendant ordered to prison. The mere signing of findings of fact and conclusions of law is not paramount and
in no way affects the guilt or innocence of the appellant
and is not prejudicial to his position.
If the court so finds that this was error, it certainly
would be classified as harmless error. Rule 61 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in
any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties,
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the sustantial rights of the
parties" (Emphasis added.)
Certainly, the appellant has failed to show or even attempt to show why or how the failure of signing the
findings of fact and conclusions of law is prejudicial of
his substantial rights. Appeal was not made until alter
said findings were entered, well over a year after the
conclusion of trial. This is indeed much more than the
allotted thirty days for appeal. This can't be prejudicial
against the defendant, it was in his favor.
The respondent therefore submits tha£ Rule 52 and
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63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be construed
liberally to include those circumstances not yet known.
The appellant requests a strict and narrow interpretation
of the Rules. Simply because Rule 63 states that another
judge may perform court duties "after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are
filed . . ." does not and should not mean that after judgment has been signed and entered, another judge cannot
make such findings when in itself the motion for formal
findings was signed. No prejudice took place, and if this
court considers this omission error, such error was harmless. The Court should therefore reject this contention
of the appellant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis of the case at bar
and based on the discussion presented in respondent's
arguments above, the respondent submits to this Court
that the trial court was correct in its finding of guilt,
the appellant had the right to waive the jury, and that
no grounds exist which warrant a reversal or granting of
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
M. REID RUSSELL
Chief Assistant Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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